Frey: Response

animal cases are seen as remarkably alike in the role
that experiences and experiences unfolding in a life play.
What the animal case has to contend with, so far as
normal adult humans are concerned, is the extent,
variety, quality, and depth of experiences that are
available to humans through the multiple dimensions
of our lives, some of which are made available to us
through the exercise of our autonomy. Nothing in all
this says that human lives are more valuable than animal
lives because they are autonomous lives; all autonomy
does, at best, is to make ranges of experiences available
to humans. Even without autonomy, animal lives are
valuable, since animals remain experiential creatures,
but without autonomy, human lives are not as valuable
as they can be, since the full range of the experiences
such lives are capable of through the additional
capacities that normal adult human lives typically
possess is not present.
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The best-laid schemes 0' mice an' men
Gang aft aglay,
An' lea'e us naught but grief an' pain,
For promised joy!"

Robert Burns}
Philosophers have cited autonomy as the reason for
thinking that the lives ofnonnal adult humans are more
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In
"Autonomy and the Orthodoxy of Human Superiority"
(hereafter, "Orthodoxy"), I questioned what value
autonomy adds to a life: are our lives better off because
we are autonomous and therefore have the ability to
pursue what we think of as the "good life"? If we take an
external perspective, the answer is plausibly negative:
because of our pursuits of what we think is a "good life,"
we have committed genocide, created nuclear weapons,
caused numerous extinctions, and wrecked havoc on the
earth's ecosystem. But if we take an inner perspective, it
seems plausible that an ability to choose our own idea of
the good life and mold our life to accommodate that idea
adds positive value to that life.
This value might be added in one of two ways. It
could be that our lives are inherently more valuable
because of these capacities or that our lives are more
valuable because of the instrumental value of these
capacities. R. G. Frey holds the instrumental position,
claiming that the exercise of autonomy enriches a life,
causing "considerable satisfaction." In investigating
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this reflection is part of what undermines Frey's
attempted defense of the "considerable satisfaction"
added to human .life by autonomy. There is nothing
unexplained here, unless one expects an explanation at
a very different level--much as the tobacco companies
continue to claim that it has not been proven that
smoking causes cancer because a molecular mechanism
has not yet been discovered.
Frey's third response is a defense of his view against
the observation that judgmentalness undermines the
satisfactoriness of life. Although judgmentalness "may
indeed lead me to become dissatisfied with the way I
am living my life at present and so may result in my
not getting out of my present way of living all that it
has to offer," he tells us that "there is no necessity about
this." Of course, I agree. We are not investigating causal
connections that have the quality of "inevitability,"
"certainty," or "necessity." But a lack of necessity does
not show a lack oflikelihood, given human nature. The
story ofTanzan and Ekido walking down a muddy road
illustrates the way judgmentalness undermines the
satisfactoriness of everyday experiences.
Frey's fourth response is an attempt to mute the force
of my claim that we are more satisfied when we live
spontaneously and in the moment. He claims that

Frey's position in "Orthodoxy," I asked: Do the
autonomous experience more satisfaction than those
who lack autonomy? This question, critical for Frey's
position, focuses only on instrumental values and clearly
does not presuppose a hedonistic account. In answering
this question, I argued that exercising the capacities of
judging, choosing ends, and pursuing attainments
diminishes the satisfactoriness of our lives.
My argument rested on three points. The ftrst is
nicely summarized in the above quote from Robert
Bums: to pursue avidly what one wants and to try to
mold one's life after some plan not only meets with
many disappointments, but even when there is success,
the loss of whatever we attain is typically inevitable.
The second point is equally straightforward: pursuing
ambitions and goals typically takes our attention away
from what is happening in the moment, and so
diminishes the satisfactoriness of the very lives we are
experiencing. The third point is also verifted by our
own experiences: when we begin assessing how to mold
our lives, contrasting how our lives are with a
conception of how we think our lives should be, we
become judgmental. Judgmentalness can and does
diminish the satisfactoriness of what would otherwise
be fully and completely satisfying.
Frey offers ftve responses to my argument and its
conclusion. His ftrst objection is that my argument is
couched in terms that are so general that it is not easy
to see that anything of significance follows. Frey's
comment about generality is utterly baffling, since our
discussion, including Frey's claims and criticisms, is at
the same level of generality. As for Frey's claim about
a lack of signiftcance, if the points I made are accurate,
they undermine his view that the exercise of autonomy
leads to overall satisfaction in a life.
Frey's second point is equally baffling. He claims
that my three points "amount to claims about what
might happen, in the absence of any explanation,
particularly any causal explanation, of why they will
happen." My argument rests on much more than what
"might happen." The relationship between pursuit,
judgmentalness, distraction, and a diminishment of
satisfaction are part of the very fabric of human life.
Many of us will lose much of what we consider to be
"ours"--parents, home, friends, loved ones, health--well
before we die. Furthermore, what we have not lost prior
to our deaths, we typically experience as losses as we
die. 2 I am sure that Frey and I each live in the same
world in which this reflection is absolutely true, and
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all Gruzalski's point comes to is the caution
that we can become too pre-occupied with
an organized life and a job or profession and
so fail to capture in our lives many of the
good things that life has to offer. But this
caution is already widely heeded: no one is a
schoolteacher or pilot twenty-four hours a day,
and it is easily possible in one's other time to
experience all ... from good meals and the
enjoyment of nature to reading ....
Frey's answer to the diminishment of satisfaction
through preoccupation, judgmentalness, and distraction
is that we adopt a hybrid approach: a proper balance of
absorption in preoccupations with periods set aside for
smelling the flowers. Frey is certainly correct that a
goal-directed life is more fulftlling if one puts into it
moments of awareness of flowers, birdsongs, and
sunsets. But if the hybrid is better than a life totally
filled with pursuit and absorbed judgmentalness, then
a life that excluded these satisfaction-minimizing
mental activities would plausibly be even better, unless
we had some reason for believing that a life of
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moment-to-moment awareness would be more
satisfactory if we injected into it judgmentalness,
distraction, and pursuit. We have no such reason.
Instead, Frey's offer of a hybrid is his way of
acknowledging how pursuing and judging can
undermine the satisfactoriness of a life.
This brings us to Frey's final objection:

sentient beings make choices and perfonn coherent sets
of actions, inclUding raising young, gathering food, and
playing, versus a life in which beings mentally posit
goals, judge the adequacy of what is present, and then
try to pursue what is not. We humans are able to
experience life in either of these ways, and these
experiences provide us with a reliable perspective for a
comparison between the value of the lives of the
autonomous and the value of the lives of the nonautonomous. Given this perspective, we are not "imagining"
what it would be like to be a mouse, an eagle, an
elephant, or how much we enrich the life of a dog by
playing fetch; instead, we are comparing how we are
when we are self-consciously judging and pursuing,
with how we are when we are acting spontaneously
and attending to what is in the present. From this
comparison we can extrapolate to what our lives would
be like overall without self-consciousness, judgmentalness, and a pursuit mentality. The result is a
comparison which is at least partly grounded in
experience and is not freely floating in the less reliable
realm of imagination. This comparison shows that the
exercise of judgmentalness and pursuit much more
plausibly lessens the overall satisfactoriness of a human
life. If we then assume, with Frey, that the value of the
autonomous life is a function of satisfactoriness, it follows
that the lives of the autonomous are less valuable than
the lives of sentient beings without autonomy.
This is a profoundly unorthodox conclusion. We are
questioning a central orthodoxy: is there any justification for believing that the life of a normal adult
human being, because of the exercise of autonomy, is
richer, and therefore more valuable, than the life of a
nonhuman animal? As a society, we live out a version
of this orthodoxy: we sell mouse traps and rat poisons,
eat meat, wear leather, allow hunting for sport, and kill
nonhuman animals not only in research facilities but
also in high school classrooms. These values are part
and parcel with the values we apply in medical ethics
and constitute the orthodoxy we are questioning. Frey,
surprisingly, claims that "one of the strengths of my
position on the value of human and anirnallife, I believe,
is that it coheres nicely with recent discussions of the
value of life in medical ethics and allied areas." But
citing practices that assume the orthodoxy is only to
cite what is in question, and so begs the question.
The orthodoxy is compelling. We are easily cajoled
into agreement when we hear rhetoric to the effect
that, by molding and shaping our lives in the pursuit

There are neurosurgeons, librarians, athletes,
and pianists; how exactly are they to live
spontaneously? Does this injunction mean that
these individuals must not have professions
in the frrst place? But then how are they to live?
And what kind of society... when professions
and other ways of organizing our lives are put
aside in favor of spontaneous living?
This question opens the way for us to become clear on
two key issues: whether people can act spontaneously
and what all this tells us about the comparative value
of human and nonhuman animal lives.
Can a person spontaneously perform ordinary,
coherent human activities? The most succinct answer
to this question requires that we recall what's at issue.
The relevant comparison is between how we are when
we cook, or make chairs, or give lectures, and how
we are when we become cooks, or become carpenters,
or become prOfessors. When we try to become
anything, we likely will have standards, values and
ambitions and might aim our activities and shape our
lives in accord with them. And we all know exactly
the difference: between just doing an activity versus
trying to do it or trying to become something. The
best athlete, the best surgeon, the best dancer, the best
cook, the best lover, when each is doing what he or
she does best, does so without employing those
capacities that make us stumble and be distracted. As
W. Timothy Gallwey writes of what he takes to be the
ideal way a person should play tennis, it involves "the
kind of spontaneous performance which occurs only
when the mind is calm and seems at one with the
body.,,3 These observations point out that by "living
spontaneously" we do not mean anything exotic or
beyond the experience of any of us, but are only
pointing to how we can be when we are not judging,
pursuing attainments, thinking about how life should
be, or trying to become something. 4
Recalling what is at issue invites us to return to our
original comparison between the value of a life in which

Between the Species

16

Winter & Spring 1996

Gruzalski: Reply

of what we think of as the good life, we enrich our
lives, and this enrichment leads to considerable overall
satisfaction. This rhetoric reflects the cultural bias of
those who enjoy middle-class luxuries and opportunities. How does Frey's notion of "richness" apply to
human beings who are poor, or who live traditional,
indigenous lifestyles? Frey tells us that "we have an
idea of what it is to live a rich, full life, of what it is to
have a life that develops and stretches our talents in
ways which indicate the full dimensions of what human
life can be." But how culturally biased is this idea that
"we" allegedly share? Is the life of a Sinkyone Native
American living in the area of Northern California a
thousand years ago as rich, according to Frey's notion
of richness, as the life of an Oxford don? Would Frey
say that a Sinkyone woman could stretch her talents to
their full dimensions as she lived out a hunter-gatherer
lifestyle that relied primarily on acorns, roots, and fish?
Is the life of this woman, who knows nothing of reading
or writing, who traditionally would not travel over 100
miles from her birthplace, and who lives as the Sinkyone
people had lived for centuries, as rich, on Frey's account,
as the life of an Oxford don? Frey provides us a partial
answer to this question in his discussion of what we
would make a point about when we say of a woman
that she has "tasted life to the full":

for such a life provides no justification for claims about
either its satisfactoriness or its value.
Instead, when we examine this rhetoric, we discover
a straightforward argument that leads to the conclusion
that exercising the capacities to judge, mold, pursue
and attain diminishes the overall satisfactoriness of our
lives. These arguments, I pointed out, are supported by
the poetic, religious, and philosophical reflections of
ancients and modems, both East and West. Frey tries to
discount this supportive material, material that speaks
to our hearts as well as to our intellects, by claiming
that my arguments rested on adopting one of these
many frameworks. My argument does not rely on
accepting any particular religious framework,
historical perspective, or cultural outlook. Rather, by
invoking several, I was pointing out the universality of
the points I was making about pursuits,judgmentalness,
and, therefore, autonomy. Unlike Frey's litany of a
narrow range of orthodoxies to support a covering
orthodoxy within the same tradition, my use of a variety
of religious, poetic, and philosophical frameworks
shows that the view for which I have argued is not
merely part of one tradition, but is found East and West,
among ancients and modems. It is, I believe, true of all
people at all times.
Nothing I have argued assumes the incommensurability of the values of human and nonhuman lives.
Like Frey, I believe we can talk meaningfully about
these comparative evaluations. Humans and nonhumans
share much in common that adds value to our lives:
contentedness, fear, stress, pleasures and pains,
companionship, sexuality, grief, teaching offspring, and
much more constitute our shared experiences. What is
at stake here is the contribution of autonomy to the value
of a life. In "Orthodoxy" I argued that it is plausible to
think that autonomy diminishes the quality and the
fullness of the lives we lead. In this response I have
defended my argument that the instrumental value of
the exercise of autonomy is a diminishment of the
satisfactoriness of our lives, for reasons partially and
beautifully summarized in the final stanza of Robert
Bums' poem "To A Mouse":

We refer to the different dimensions of our
being and to the woman's attempt to develop
these in herself and to actualize them in the
course of her daily life. And an important
aspect in all this is what agency means to the
woman: in the sense intended, she is not
condemned to live the life that all of her
ancestors have lived; she can mold and shape
her life to "fit" her own conception of how
she should live, thereby enabling her to add
further dimensions of value for her life.5
Since in traditional indigenous life one lives the life of
one's ancestors, the implication of Frey's quote is a
devaluation of the life of women (and men by
implication) in traditional indigenous communities. But
Frey offers no argument in favor of this devaluation,
only an unfounded (and indefensible) rhetoric to
celebrate a peculiar kind of human life that enjoys
sufficient wealth to provide the leisure and opportunity
to lead a life of one's own choosing. However familiar
and mesmerizing, the rhetoric that reflects our biases
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Still thou are blest, compared wi' me!
The present only toucheth thee:
But och! I backward cast my e'e,
On prospects dread!
An' forward, though I cmma see,
I guess an' fear. 6
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To think that the capacities Frey collects under the
notion of autonomy, the capacities of judging and
pursuing what we think of as the good life, cause our
lives to be more satisfactory and, therefore, more
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals, is an
unjustifiable myth. To use this myth to discount and
marginalize the lives of our brother and sister animals
is a real tragedy, for them as well as for us.
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Robert Burns, "To A Mouse," in The Literature of
England II ed. Anderson and Buckley (Glenview, Illinois:
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2This is typically part of the dying experience. Of course,
there are modes of dying-massive and "instantaneous"-in
which this experience might not occur. But even in automobile
and other "quick" threats to living, those who recover not
infrequently report adequate psychological time for insights,
recollections, and the experience of loss.
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Timothy Gallwey, The Inner Game of Tennis (New
York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. ii.
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Did you know that philosophers have also made
a contribution to the growth of the animal
liberation movement?-Think of Clark, Magel,
Regan, Rollin, Singer and Sapontzis.

Although we know what moments like this are like,
the question arises whether an entire day, week, or the rest
of a life could be lived in this way. This is an interesting
question but one tangential to our main issue. I have argued
elsewhere for the possibility that an entire life could exhibit
the spontaneity most of us only experience upon occasion.
See my "The Possibility of Nonattachment," Buddhism And
The Emerging World Civilization, ed. Ramakrishna
Puligandla and David L. Miller (Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), pp. 3-14. Given
that the instrumental value of the exercise of autonomy is
overall negative (a diminishment of the satisfactoriness of
our lives), then we are either tragically flawed or caught in
a tragic drama in which we are both victim and accomplice.
It is ironic that it is this tragic character of our lives that
Frey has claimed makes our lives more valuable than the
lives of nonhuman animals.
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